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III. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER THE STATUTORY GRANT OF IMMUNITY 
FOR GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES ENGAGED IN PROPRIETARY 
ON NON-GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS VIOLATES THE OPEN 
COURTS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IS AN ISSUE 
THAT CAN AND SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THIS COURT 
The County says that the statutory grant of immunity, in 
Section 63-30-2(4)(c) was never an issue in this case.(Respondent's 
Brief p. 12). The County's response is deceptive. Throughout this 
litigation, the DeBrys argued that Section 63-30-4 violated the 
open court's provision. In addition, the DeBrys argued that under 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), 
enforcement of the building code was not a governmental function. 
However, the Court of Appeals did not engage in any 
Standiford analysis. Instead, it held: 
[S]ection 63-30-4 grants sovereign immunity to 
state entities for all causes of action except 
fraud and malice [and] does not violate 
Article I Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
Debry v. Salt Lake County, 188 Ut. Adv. Rep. 55, 57 (Utah 
App 1992) (hereafter "Debry at " ) . 
However, prior to the 1987 Governmental Immunity Act 
amendments, Section 63-30-4 did not bar all causes of action except 
fraud and malice. (Petition for Certiorari pp. 7-9). Section 63-30-
4 barred all claims only after the legislature changed the 
definition of a governmental function by enacting Section § 63-30-2 
(4)(c). 
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In summary, under common law, the DeBrys win. (Petition 
for Certiorari pp 7-9). Under a Standiford analysis, summary 
judgment is impossible. (Petition for Certiorari pp 6-7). However, 
when the definition of a governmental function in Section 63-3 0-
2(4)(c) is coupled with Section 63-30-4 the DeBrys lose. Thus, 
this case presents an excellent opportunity to decide whether the 
statutory grant of governmental immunity for proprietary or non-
governmental functions violates the open court's clause of Utah's 
Constitution. 
POINT II 
DEBRYS DO NOT SEEK TO 
CREATE A NEW RIGHT OF ACTION 
The County says the all encompassing statutory grant of 
sovereign immunity does not violate the open court's provisions of 
Utah's Constitution because Article I Section 11 "worked no changes 
in the principle of sovereign immunity" and was not meant to create 
a new remedy or a new right of action (Respondent's Brief p. 7). 
The Court of Appeals said the same thing. DeBry at 57. The County 
does not identify the claimed new right or action. Nor does it 
explain what principle of sovereign immunity the DeBrys seek to 
change. 
At common law the County and its chief building inspector 
were liable. (Petition for Certiorari pp.7-9). Moreover, Utah's 
governmental immunity statute was copied from Michigan. Michigan 
Courts held that building inspections are not protected. Brand v. 
Hartman. 332 N.W. 2d 479 (Mich. App. 1983). In short, the DeBrys 
Petition is not based on a new right or on new principle of 
sovereign immunity advocated by them. Rather, the Petition focuses 
on a new principle of sovereign immunity adopted by the legislature 
when it changed the governmental function definition. 
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POINT III 
WHETHER THE COUNTY'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW, 
ENFORCE AND COMPLY WITH ITS BUILDING CODE 
IS A CORE GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION PROTECTED BY 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS AN OPEN ISSUE 
The County's failure to follow and enforce its Building 
Code does not involve core governmental functions protected by 
governmental immunity. (Petition for Certiorari pp. 7-9.) The 
County's response is a rehash of the Court of Appeals Analysis. The 
Court of Appeals ruled that the DeBrys' claims arise out of an 
activity set forth in Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(1) (c) . DeBry. at 
58. The Court then said: 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held as a matter 
of law, that those functions expressly 
enumerated in Section 63-30-10 are core 
governmental function. . . . (Condemarin v. 
University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 350, (Utah 
1989). 
However, this Court in Condemarin held no such thing. 
"The holding of the [Condemarim Court is limited to the following: 
the recovery limits statutes are unconstitutional as applied to 
University Hospital." Condemarin at 366. 
The Condemarin language relied upon by both the County 
and the Court of Appeals is dicta in Part I of Judge Durham's 
opinion. None of the other four justices concurred in Part I of the 
Condemarin opinion. Condemarin. at 366, 369, 375. 
In summary, neither Condemarin nor the other cases cited 
by the County resolve the issue of whether the County's failure to 
follow and enforce its building code is a protected governmental 
function. 
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POINT IV 
THE RELATED ISSUES OF WHETHER THE DEBRYS HAVE BEEN 
DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND RIGHT TO A JURY 
TRIAL ARE ISSUES THAT ARE PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
The DeBrys, alleged that when the County evicted them, 
the County deprived them of their property interests guaranteed by 
the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution (Exhibit 1) . The First, Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit the County from retaliating against the DeBrys 
for exercising their constitutional rights. See Blackledae v. 
Perry. ( 417 U.S. 2, 1971). In this case, the DeBrys were evicted 
after they filed a notice of claim with Salt Lake County (Exhibits 
2 and 3.) 
When the County moved for Summary Judgment, it did not 
set forth any facts contesting the retaliation claim. (Exhibit 3). 
Moreover, its constitutional argument was limited to: (1) the 
DeBrys damages "are a result of their own actions, not those of the 
County (Exhibit 4 p. 14), and (2) the enforcement of the building 
code is an exercise of police power. (Exhibit 4 p. 14). 
Since the retaliation issue was not raised, the DeBrys 
were not required to respond. Rule 4-501(2) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration. However, that did not stop the trial court from 
throwing out all of the DeBrys claims. The Court said: 
The plaintiffs have not been deprived of their 
First, Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment rights 
under the United States Constitution by virtue 
of Salt Lake Countyfs having issued a Notice 
and Order to vacate the plaintifffs premises. 
DeBry at 58 
On appeal, the DeBrys challenged the unsupported finding 
(Appellants1 brief pp. 39-43, Exhibit 5). Debrys also said that 
whether the County retaliated against the Debrys was a factual 
question. (Id). Had the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the 
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record lacks support for the lower Court's finding of no 
constitutional violation, the DeBrys would have their day in court. 
However, the Court of Appeals did not do that. Instead it said: 
[T]he DeBrys fail to establish nor does the 
record indicate that the County engaged in any 
retaliatory action against the DeBrys 
following the filing of their Complaint. 
DeBry at 59. The record did not indicate retaliation because the 
issue was never raised factually or legally by the County as 
required by Rule 4-501.l 
In summary, the case started out as an appeal of a 
Summary Judgment lacking factual and legal support. However, the 
Court of Appeals by sanctioning the baseless finding of the trial 
court raises the important issue of whether the DeBrys have been 
denied their right to due process and a jury trial. The DeBrys 
Petition timely raises these important issues. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the assertion set forth in the County's 
brief, the DeBrys have raised three important questions of state 
law which are not settled and should be resolved by this Court. 
Certiorari is warranted under 46(b) and (d). 
DATED this (& day of $ crTdlo^e^^ 1992. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
Evidence of retaliation exists. See Petition for Certiorari 
pp. 14-15. The facts set forth in the Petition were stricken from 
Appellant's brief because they were developed after the Summary 
Judgment was granted. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
LEONARD E. McGEE - A2185 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES a general 
partnership; DEL K. BARTEL; 
DALE THURGOOD; ROBERT G. HILL; 
UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT CO.; 
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, a general 
partnership; LEE ALLEN BARTEL; 
SALMON AND ALDER, INC.; WILLIAM 
TRIGGER d.b.a. TRIGGER ROOFING; 
ZEPHYR ELECTRIC, INC.; SAWYER 
GLASS CO., INC.; TRIAD SERVICES 
CO., INC.; VALLEY MORTGAGE 
CORP., INC.; RICHARDS-WOODBURY 
MORTGAGE CORP.; WALLACE R. 
NOBLE, individually and in his 
official capacity SALT LAKE 
COUNTY; SCOTT McDONALD REALTY, 
INC.; STANLEY POSTMA; TRI-K 
CONTRACTORS; KEN BAR MANUFAC-
TURING COMPANY; GRANDEUR HOMES; 
BUILDERS COMPONENTS; SOTER-
KNUDSEN; VAN ELLSWORTH dba 
DRAFTING UNLIMITED; CANADA LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY; BUILDING 
SYSTEMS, INC., and FIDELITY 
NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE CO., 
Defendants. 
SECOND REVISED 
SUBSTITUTE THIRD 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C86-553 
JUDGE PAT BRIAN 
nr r pfisv 
VIOLATIONS OF STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
31. Defendants Cascade Enterprises, Thurgood, and 
Bartel violated §5 8A-la-4f Utah Code Annotated in that they 
acted as contractors without a license. 
32. Defendants Cascade Enterprises, Bartel, and 
Thurgood violated Sec. 2-1-1, Salt Lake County Ordinances, 
of January 14, 1983 (Uniform Building Code 5303(a)) in that 
they did not obtain any "approved" plans and specifications 
from Salt Lake County officials. 
33. Defendants Cascade Enterprises, Bartel and 
Thurgood violated Sec. 2-1-1 Salt Lake County Ordinances of 
January 14, 1983 (Uniform Building Code 5301(a)) in that 
they constructed the building without a valid building 
permit. 
34. Defendants Cascade Enterprises, Bartel and 
Thurgood violated Sec. 2-1-1 Salt Lake County Ordinances of 
January 14, 1983 (Uniform Building Code §303(a)) in that 
they did not do the work in accordance with plans approved 
by Salt Lake County. 
35. Defendants Cascade Enterprises, Bartel and 
Thurgood violated Sec. 2-1-1 Salt Lake County Ordinances of 
January 14, 1983 (Uniform Building Code §305) in that they 
did not request or obtain all of the inspections required by 
Salt Lake County. 
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36. Defendants Cascade Enterprises, Bartel and 
Thurgood violated Sec. 2-1-1 Salt Lake County Ordinances of 
January 14, 1983 (Uniform Building Code §202 (d)) in that 
they constructed the building during the pendency of a "stop 
order." 
37. Defendants Cascade Enterprises, Bartel and 
Thurgood violated Sec. 2-1-8 of the Salt Lake County Ordi-
nances of January 14, 1983, in that they proceeded with the 
work without obtaining separate plumbing and mechanical 
permits. 
38. Defendants Cascade Enterprises, Bartel and 
Thurgood have violated §58-la-13, Utah Code Ann., by main-
taining an action for damages notwithstanding the fact that 
none of them are licensed contractors. 
DEFECTS 
39. After the closing, plaintiffs found numerous 
defects in the building. These defects could not have been 
reasonably discovered prior to closing. These defects 
include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(a) All items listed in the certified letter from 
the Chief Building Official dated March 19, 
1986. A true copy of this letter is attached 
as Exhibit L hereto. 
(b) All other defects as described in paragraph 
51, below• 
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(c) The cooling capacity provided for the lower 
floor is far below that necessary to cool the 
building. As a result, the cooling on the 
lower level is uneven and insufficient. 
(d) The supply duct is far below industry stan-
dards in size. This generates static 
pressure throughout the duct system in excess 
of what the rooftop and furnace system are 
capable of delivering air through. This 
results in uneven distribution of supply air 
and inadequate air flow. 
(e) The diffusers are inadequate to deliver air 
at a noise level less than NC-35 which is the 
industry standard. 
(f) The roof has no drains. If the roof is not 
run dead flat, drains are necessary. If the 
roof is not run dead flat, the roof life is 
compromised. In either case, roof drains are 
standard practice to protect the roof and 
prevent structural overload. 
(g) Air supply grilles on the first floor are 
introduced at floor level generating cold 
stratification near the floor which is below 
the industry standard. 
(h) There are interior and exterior spaces in the 
same heating/cooling zones. This makes the 
heating/cooling uneven and makes it impos-
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sible to simultaneously maintain the same 
temperature in both interior and exterior 
spaces which is below the industry standard. 
(i) Almost all return air grilles are located in 
interior spaces and no returns are in exteri-
or spaces. This causes stale and stagnant 
air conditions whenever interior doors are 
closed which is below the industry standard. 
(j) Flexible ductwork has been used almost 
exclusively for branch ducts in the second 
floor. The ductwork has been run in a manner 
below the industry standard, both as to 
length of run and straightness of run. This 
creates excessive static pressure loss whichf 
when combined with the undersizing of the 
ducts, makes adequate heating and cooling of 
the building almost impossible. 
(k) The furnace is not located in a 1-hour fire 
rated enclosure which is a violation of the 
Uniform Building Code. 
(1) The structural steel of the exit has not been 
completely primed and painted. 
(m) Earth has been placed directly against the TS 
3-1/2 X 3/1/2 X 1/4 columns at ground level. 
(n) Non-structural 1/2" diameter bolts were used 
to connect channel stringers to the elevated 
landing. 
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(o) A footing was not constructed for the low end 
of the stairway. 
(p) Non-bearing steel stud partitions were 
installed without a gap between the top of 
the walls and the bottom chord of the trus-
ses. 
(q) From one to three 3/4" diameter through bolts 
were missing in the majority of beam saddles. 
(r) Footings do not have adequate frost depth at 
the north entrance, west entrance and east 
center window. 
(s) The upstairs northwest corner room windows 
are not square, plumb and level. 
(t) The conference room windows in the northwest 
corner are loose and lack proper settling 
blocks, gaskets, and installation. 
(u) The glazing of the windows in the copy room 
is broken. 
(v) The glass wall of the entrance lobby is 
leaking water. 
(w) The glass mullion system in the entrance 
lobby is not designed for the existing 
structural loading and span. 
(x) The mullion system is not self-guttering or 
otherwise protected from water infiltration, 
and thus leaks in several places. 
(y) There is no drainage for a window on the east 
side lower level, causing water leakage. 
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(z) Toilet partitions are not installed. 
(aa) Exposed wood en the parapet is not covered by 
counter-flashing. 
(bb) Steel headers over the windows are not 
painted. 
(cc) Flashing on the parapet wall is not joined 
properly and will leak, 
(dd) The gutters on the south side do not drain 
properly and leak over the electrical switch 
panels. 
(ee) Soffit material under the windows is not 
finished. 
(ff) Fresh air inlet on the south side is not 
installed properly. 
(gg) There is no insulation in the walls, nor 
between the first floor ceiling and the floor 
above, nor behind the spandrel glass areas. 
(hh) There is 1-1/2 inches perlite board for 
exterior wall insulation, which is inadequate 
according to the Utah Energy Code, 
(ii) Handicap handrails are not installed in the 
restrooms. 
(jj) West side exterior stairway is not painted, 
nor does it have footings or a landing. In 
general, it is structurally highly unsafe. 
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(kk) The roof is not properly installed. The 
flashings are not properly installed or 
practical, nor is the corner flashing proper-
ly installed. 
40. After the closing, plaintiffs found in the 
building numerous violations of applicable building codes. 
These violations could not have been reasonably discovered 
prior to closing. These violations are as follows. (All 
references are to the Uniform Building Code, National 
Electric Code, Uniform Mechanical Code, and Uniform Plumbing 
Code, all as adopted by Salt Lake County in Ordinance 838.) 
(a) The distance between the exits on the second 
level is 48 feet. (U.B.C. 53303(c).) 
(b) The stair length of the center stairs is 
greater than 12 feet. (U.B.C. §3306(i).) 
(c) The wallboard installation in the hallways 
does not meet 1 HR rating requirements. 
(U.B.C. §3305(2) and Table No. 43-B, Item 
71.) 
(d) Fixtures and ceiling grills are not fire 
rated. (U.B.C. §4303(a)(6).) 
(e) The required fire protection or fire dampers 
have not been installed for all penetration 
in the ceiling. (U.B.C. §4303(a)(6).) 
(f) The doors are not 20-minute fire rated, nor 
do they have door closers, smoke seals, or 
fire rated frames. (U.B.C. §3305 (h).) 
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(g) The upstairs restroom door swings into an 
existing way, and entering traffic, allowing 
a width of only 14 inches. (U.B.C. 
53305(d).) 
(h) The upstairs west exit door requires exit 
through an adjoining room and, therefore, 
does not provide for a continuous exit way. 
(U.B.C. §3305(a).) 
(i) The upstairs west exit door has no means to 
exit without a key when the door is locked. 
(U.B.C. §3304(d).) 
(j) The hallway for the office on the east side 
upstairs is more than 20 feet long. (U.B.C. 
53305(e).) 
(k) The front door has no exit device or sign to 
remain open during working hours, nor means 
to exit without a key when the door is 
locked. (U.B.C. 53304(c).) 
(1) No draft stops in ceiling space. (U.B.C. 
52516(f).) 
(m) The suspended ceiling and light fixtures are 
not anchored properly for seismic bracing. 
(N.E.C. §4010-16.) 
(n) Service entrance conductors are 350 MCM THW 
rated for 310 amps maximum. (N.E.C. 
230-90(a); N.E.C. 240-3 Exc. No. 1.) 
(o) Ground electrode conductor to water pipe is 
only #2 gauge wire. (N.E.C. Table 250-94.) 
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(p) Ground electrode conductor is exposed for 18" 
from ground rod to conduit. (N.E.C. 
250-92(a).) 
(q) Neither the conductor to the v;ater pipe nor 
the conductor to the ground rod have been 
bonded to the conduit at the end opposite 
from the equipment enclosure. (N.E.C. 
250-92(a).) 
(r) The auxiliary gutter is only 6 inches wide. 
(N.E.C. 370-18.) 
(s) The overcurrent protection for the 200 amp 
feeders to each of the panel boards is 225 
amps. (N.E.C. 240-3.) 
(t) Panel B is protected by a 225 amp breaker. 
(N.E.C. 384-16(a).) 
(u) The bending radius of the 3/0 conduction in 
the two panels is less than three inches. 
(N.E.C. 300-34.) 
(v) Each panel has been field modified to accom-
modate a 225-amp side mount main breaker, 
which does not meet code required minimum 
bending space. (N.E.C. 373-6(a).) 
(w) A blue conductor has been used as a neutral 
conductor. (N.E.C. 210-5(a)• ) 
(:;) One of the panels has been used as an enclo-
sure for splicing conductors which pass 
through conduit to another panel. (N.E.C. 
300-15(a).) 
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(y) The receptacles as presently installed 
without bonding jumpers are not approved for 
grounding. (N.E.C. 250-74.) 
(z) Light fixtures are not secured to the ceiling 
framing member. (N.E.C. 410-16 (c).) 
(aa) Orange conductor has been used as a grounding 
conductor. (N.E.C. 210-5(b).) 
(bb) Grounding conductor has been terminated on 
screws used to attach cover plates. (N.E.C. 
250-114(a).) 
(cc) Flexible metal conduit lengths longer than 6 
feet have not been supported. (N.E.C. 
350-4.) 
(dd) The conduits run above the ceiling are not 
property supported. (N.E.C. 348-12.) 
(ee) Outside conduit has been installed partly on 
fenceposts and partly on earth without 
required support. (N.E.C. 346-12; Table 
300-5.) 
(ff) Flexible conduit is used outside where 
exposed to physical damage. (N.E.C. 351-4.) 
(gg) Supports are not provided for flexible 
conduit to lightpoles. (N.E.C. 351-8.) 
(hh) Some outdoor junction boxes are located under 
the fence and are not accessible without 
removing the fence. (N.E.C. 370-19.) 
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(ii) No enclosures have been installed around 
recessed fixtures mounted in the lobby and 
exits to maintain fire rating of ceiling. 
(U.B.C. 4303-6.) 
(jj) The contractor has installed a non-fused 
disconnect switch at the condenser unit, and 
has used non-KACR rated breakers in the 
panelboard. This voids the UL labelling on 
the condenser. (N.E.C. 110-3(a).) 
(kk) The panels installed were listed UL with main 
lugs only. Modifying these panels by adding 
a main breaker has voided the UL label. 
(N.E.C. 110-3(a).) 
(11) There is not 5 cfm of outside air per occu-
pant as required by the Uniform Mechanical 
Code, §605. In fact, there is no outside 
air. 
(mm) The building requires two water closets and 
lavoratories in each women's restroom; and 
two lavoratories, one urinal and one water 
closet in the men's restroom. (Uniform 
Plumbing Code, Appendix C.) 
(nn) The ledger bolts next to the 8-foot windows 
are overloaded by a factor of 7.3 for live 
load, partition load and dead load. (U.B.C. 
2510(b).) 
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(oo) The ledger bolts described above are over-
loaded for dead load by a factor of 1.6, and 
therefore, the second floor cannot support 
any live or partition load. (U.B.C. 
2510(b)•) 
(pp) There was no floor or roof diaphragm design. 
(U.B.C. 2312(j)2C.) 
(qq) There v;as no sub-diaphragm design or con-
struction. (U.B.C. 2312 (j)2C.) 
(rr) The edges of the large rectangular opening at 
the front entrance of the first floor do not 
have reinforcement to transfer shearing 
stresses. (U.B.C. 2513(a).) 
(ss) The roof and floor diaphragm connections to 
the masonry walls use toenails, and subject 
the 2" X 12" ledgers to cross-grain bending 
and tension. (U.B.C. 2310 and 2312(j)3A.) 
(tt) The roof and floor diaphragm boundaries do 
not have positive connection to the respec-
tive diaphragm chords and masonry walls. 
(U.B.C. 2310 and 2513(a).) 
(uu) The first floor ledgers acting as diaphragm 
chords between masonry walls cannot carry the 
required tensile and compression chord 
forces. (U.B.C. 2513(c) and 2312(j)2C.) 
(w) Perimeter masonry shear walls are over-
stressed in shear and are not adequately 
reinforced for seismic overturning movement. 
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Furthermore, installed vertical reinforcing 
is less than the #5 at 32" O.C. called for in 
the drawings. There is no positive 
connection in places by the reinforcing 
between the masonry and concrete foundation. 
One place where this was not done in the 
southeast storage room is critical to the 
overall seismic integrity of the building. 
(U.B.C. 2312(f) and Table No. 24-H, 4(b).) 
(ww) The two through bolts that anchor the east 
side of the west exit landing to the building 
are overloaded by a factor of 5.3 for live 
and dead load. (U.B.C. Table No. 23-A.) 
(xx) There are a number of job modified trusses, 
trusses with eccentric bearings and a broken 
truss. The press plates of a number of 
trusses had been bent back upon itself 1-1/2" 
- 1-3/4". As a result of these defects, the 
trusses in the floor and roof cannot carry 
the load capacity required by the Uniform 
Building Code. 
(yy) Nail spacings on the roof and floor sheathing 
are sporadic and often exceed 6 inches. 
(U.B.C. Table No. 25-J.) 
(zz) Nailhead generally fractured the surface of 
the sheathing. (U.B.C. 2513(a)). 
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PLAINTIFFS' FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS WALLACE, 
RAY NOBLE, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PUBLIC WORKS DEPT., AND SALT LAKE COUNTY 
NEGLIGENCE 
41. Wallace Ray Noble was at all times relevant to 
this complaint the Chief Building Official to the Development 
Services Division of the Salt Lake County Public Works Depart-
ment, 
42. Defendant Salt Lake County had a duty to 
enforce certain statutes and regulations as alleged in 
paragraphs 31 through 38, above in that such statutes and 
regulations were promulgated for the protection of plaintiffs 
and other members of the general public. 
43. Defendant Salt Lake County failed to enforce 
the said statutes and regulations. 
44. By reason of the failure of defendant Salt Lake 
County to enforce the said statutes and regulations, the 
building was constructed with the various defects alleged in 
paragraphs 39 and 40f above; and the construction on the 
building continued notwithstanding a valid "stop work" order. 
45. Defendants Salt Lake County and Wallace Ray 
Noble had actual or constructive knowledge of the various 
violations of statutes and ordinances alleged in paragraphs 
3 3-40 above. Furthermore, defendants Salt Lake County and 
Wallace Ray Noble had actual or constructive knowledge that 
plaintiffs believed that all statutes and ordinances had been 
20 
satisfied, and that plaintiffs relied thereon in purchasing 
the building. 
46. Defendant Salt Lake County conducted certain 
inspections of the building, and in the course of such inspec-
tions, Salt Lake County discovered some or all of the vio-
lations alleged in paragraphs 31-3 8, above, and some or all of 
the defects alleged in paragraphs 39, 40, above, below. 
Notwithstanding this actual knowledge, defendants failed to 
require the contractors and builders to correct the defects 
and violations. Furthermore, defendant Salt Lake County 
failed to warn plaintiffs and other members of the general 
public of the defects and violations. Finally, defendants 
failed to stop the construction of the building. 
47. Defendant Salt Lake County, through its agent 
Wallace Ray Noble, issued a "temporary certificate of occupan-
cy" without making any inspection. Either before or after 
issuing the temporary certificate of occupancy, Salt Lake 
County had actual knowledge that no building permit had ever 
been issued, and that certain portions of the building did not 
meet the requirements of the U.B.C. Furthermore, Salt Lake 
County and Wallace Ray Noble had actual knowledge that plain-
tiffs were preparing to finalize their purchase in reliance 
upon the fact that a building permit had been issued, and in 
reliance on the fact that the temporary certificate of occu-
pancy was bona fide. Notwithstanding this actual knowledge, 
Salt Lake County and Wallace Ray Noble failed to revoke the 
temporary certificate of occupancy, and failed to advise 
plaintiffs of the defect. 
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48. By reason of Salt Lake County's and Wallace Ray 
Noble's conduct, alleged above, plaintiffs closed the sale on 
a building which is neither habitable nor fit for its intended 
use as an office building. If the contract between plaintiff 
and Cascade Enterprises is not rescinded, plaintiffs will be 
damaged by the cost of repairing the defects and the costs of 
maintaining litigation against third parties. These costs 
have not yet been ascertained. 
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
AGAINST DEFENDANT NOBLE, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PUBLIC WORKS DEPT., AND SALT LAKE COUNTY 
FRAUD 
49. Defendant Noble, acting as agent for Salt Lake 
County, issued a temporary certificate of occupancy on the 
premises at 4252 South 700 East. 
50. The signed temporary certificate of occupancy 
was a representation to the citizens of Salt Lake County that: 
(a) Salt Lake County has "approved" the plans 
pursuant to §303 (a) of the Uniform Building 
Code; 
(b) A valid building permit has been issued 
pursuant to §303 (a), Uniform Building Code; 
(c) That all inspections required by §305 (a) of the 
Uniform Building Code have been conducted; 
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in that: 
(d) That no work has been done on the building 
beyond the point indicated in each successive 
inspection without first obtaining the approval 
of the building inspector as required by 
5305(d), Uniform Building Code; 
(e) That all work on the building has been done in 
accordance with the "approved" plans as 
required by §303(a) of the Uniform Building 
Code; 
(f) That the building official has made a special 
finding that no substantial hazard would result 
from occupancy of the building as required by 
§307(d) of the Uniform Building Code. 
51. Each of the foregoing representations was false 
(a) Salt Lake County has not "approved" the plans 
pursuant to §303(a) of the Uniform Building 
Code; 
(b) A valid building permit has not been issued 
pursuant to §303(a) , Uniform Building Code; 
(c) That all inspections required by §305(a) of the 
Uniform Building Code have not been conducted; 
(d) That work was done on the building beyond the 
point indicated in each successive inspection 
without first obtaining the approval of the 
building inspector as required by §305(d), 
Uniform Building Code; 
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(e) That not all work on the building has been done 
in accordance with the "approved" plans as 
required by §303(a) of the Uniform Building 
Code; 
(f) That the building official has not made a 
special finding that no substantial hazard 
would result from occupancy of the building as 
required by §307(d) of the Uniform Building 
Code. 
52. Defendant Noble and defendant Salt Lake County 
had actual knowledge that the representations were false when 
the temporary certificate of occupancy was issued; or in the 
alternativef defendants Noble and Salt Lake County had actual 
knowledge that the representations were false immediately 
after the temporary certificate of occupancy was issued, and 
said defendants failed to rescind or revoke or withdraw the 
representation. 
53. Plaintiffs relied on the said representations 
by completing their purchase of the building and occupying the 
premises. 
54. Plaintiffs were damaged in that the 
representations were false and the building is neither 
habitable nor fit for its intended use. If the contract 
between plaintiffs and Cascade is not rescindedf plaintiffs 
will be damaged by the cost of repairing the premises which is 
not yet ascertained. 
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PLAINTIFFS1 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
AGAINST DEFENDANT NOBLE, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY PUBLIC WORKS, AND SALT LAKE COUNTY 
55. Defendant Noble, acting under color of State 
lav;, issued a temporary certificate of occupancy to plain-
tiffs, thereby representing that the building was safe for 
human habitation. 
56. Plaintiffs believed Noble's representations 
that the building was safe for human habitation and plain-
tiffs, therefore, effected a purchase. 
57. Thereafter, Salt Lake County evicted plaintiffs 
from the building on the grounds that it was not safe for 
human habitation. 
58. As a direct result of the notice to vacate, 
plaintiffs have been deprived of their liberty within the 
meaning of the 1st and 14th Amendments, in that their freedom 
of enterprise and occupation has been taken away. 
59. As a further result of the notice to vacate, 
plaintiffs have been deprived of their property within the 
meaning of the 5th and 14th Amendments, in that they have been 
wrongfully deprived of the use of their building. 
60. As a further result of the notice to vacate, 
plaintiffs have been deprived of equal protection of the laws, 
within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. 
61. As a direct and proximate result of the de-
privation of the Constitutional rights listed above, plain-
tiffs have been damaged in that they have lost the use of 
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their property and their freedom to pursue their occupation. 
Plaintiffs have further been damaged in that they purchased a 
building which is defective and uninhabitable in reliance on 
defendant's representation that the building was fit for 
occupancy. If the contract between plaintiffs and Cascade 
Enterprises is not rescinded, plaintiffs will have been 
damaged in the cost of making repairs to the building, the 
amount of which is not presently known. 
PLAINTIFFS1 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
AGAINST DEFENDANT SCOTT McDONALD 
62. Defendant Scott McDonald Realty, Inc., is a 
real estate agent and broker. 
63. Defendant Scott McDonald Realty, Inc., ap-
proached plaintiffs with the proposition to purchase the 
building. In so doing, defendant McDonald acted as agent for 
the seller. 
64. Plaintiffs paid defendant Scott McDonald 
Realty, Inc., in excess of $20,000 in commissions. 
65. Defendant Scott McDonald Realty, Inc., had a 
duty to determine the accuracy of the information in the 
listing agreement and otherwise, to be honest, ethical and 
competent in all of his dealings with plaintiffs. 
66. Defendant Scott McDonald Realty, Inc., knew or 
should have known that neither Cascade Enterprises nor Cascade 
Construction had any contractor's license nor any building 
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EXHIBIT 2 
&252 J^A. 700 tiaU 
CTMJC -ZJIA*, ~Guty,' UCaAs 
801 2 6 2 - 8 9 1 5 
May 13,1986 
Personal Service and 
Certified Mail 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
TO: ^^E^^^J^^^^^^^^^SS^T^^OO^ 407, 
Salt Lake City & County Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah and 
teaM&a^ and 
as representative of Salt Lake 
County Public Works Department 
Gentlemen: 
On or about December 13, 1985, Robert and Joan De3ry 
closed the sale of a building they were purchasing. The 
building they purchased is located at 4252 South 700 East in 
Salt Lake County. To close the sale, Joan DeBry and Robert 
DeBry paid Cascade Enterprises $550,577.93 in cash and executed 
a note in the face amount of $62,500.00. The note is subject 
to an agreement that allows reduction of the note under certain 
circumstances. The note is now subject to litigation between 
the DeBrys and Cascade Enterprises. Part of the cash came from 
a $500,000.00 loan claimants obtained from Richards-Woodbury 
Mor'. rrace Co. 
In addition to-these sums, claimants paid $21,000.00 
in real estate commissions and have spent not less than 
$61,945.83 extra financing, finishing antf repairing the 
building they purchased. Liens totallinc S6,791.11 have been 
FILE COPY 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
RE: DeBry v. Cascade, et al. 
Page -2-
placed against the property. The total amount that claimants 
have spent or may be held liable for as a result of their 
purchase is not less than $702,820.83. The expenses incurred 
by claimants have not been - fully calculated and continue to 
accrue. 
A specific condition of the agreement between the 
DeBrys and Cascade Enterprises was that the DeBrys would be 
furnished with a valid Certificate of Occupancy before they 
would have any obligation to close. To meet this condition, 
Del B-axtel, one of Cascade Enterprises' partners persuaded 
Wallace Ray Noble to issue a temporary certificate of 
occupancy, a copy of which:is attached as Exhibit "A". Based 
upon this, the De3rys and their lender, Richards-Woodbury, went 
through with the closing. 
This temporary certificate was issued without the 
required inspections set forth in the Building Code. In fact, 
it was issuec even though Cascade Enterprises and those working 
for it had only obtained a footing and foundation permit. 
Furthermore, the required set of approved plans was not filed 
with Salt Lake County by the builders. Wallace Ray Noble knew, 
or should have known, when he issued the temporary certificate 
that the building was built without required permits, the 
required inspections, or the required set of approved plans. 
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He did not inform the DeBrys or their lender that required 
inspections had not been conducted, or that required permits 
had not been issued. Because Del Bartel had informed him that 
the lender required such a certificate, he knew that his 
certificate was to be relied on in closing the sale. 
After the DeBrys took possession of the premises, 
they learned that the heating system was inferior to that set 
forth in plans Cascade Enterprises had given them. They 
learned that a major part of the cooling system was missing. 
They Teamed of many other defects in the building including 
those listed in the letter from Wallace Ray Noble, a copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit "B". 
Because of the significance of the defects and the 
lack of the inspections which are contemplated by the building 
permit process, the DeBrys have brought suit to rescind the 
contract with Cascade Enterprises. Salt Lake County and 
Wallace Ray Noble are jointly liable with Cascade Enterprises 
to restore claimants to the status quo which existed prior to 
the date of the temporary occupancy certificate and are liable 
to claimants in an amount equal to the sums plaintiffs have 
expended and will spend on or in connection with the building 
at 4252 South 700 East since December 7, 1985. That amount has 
not yet been fully ascertained. Jt is no less than 
$702,820. S3, and additional amounts have or will be soer.t. 
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If claimants are unable to rescind the sale, or elect 
not to do so, Salt Lake County and Wallace Ray Noble are liable 
to claimants for damages. These damages have not yet been 
fully calculated but they include damages for loss of 
marketability of the building in an unknown amount, damages in 
an amount equal to the cost of conducting the inspections that 
would have been conducted had the correct building permit 
procedure been followed, and the expenses incurred by claimants 
to correct defects in the building. The amount of these 
damages have not yet been determined. 
Claimants have an estimate that the cost of bringing 
the heating and "air conditioning up to a reasonable standard is 
between S28,476.64 and $38,184.52. The cost of circuit break-
ers which remain to be installed is $613.00 for parts only. A 
retaining wall needs to be raised along the north side. It 
will cost no less than $364.00 to raise the one foot along the 
north side. Liens totalling $6,791.11 have been placed against 
the property. It will take between $325 to $800 to finish the 
roof, excluding leak repairs. Claimants have spent at least 
S23,542.42 on matters which claimants claim Cascade Enterprises 
had the responsibility to perform and on items for which the 
appropriation of the amount of the allowance given by the 
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contractor is disputed. Thus, total damages that claimants 
presently have estimates or documentation on could total 
$67,295.55. 
This figure does not include costs of repairing the 
cement parking lot, the costs of repairing additional leaks in 
the roof, the cost of repairing other contact breaches, the 
cost of completing all the things that need to be completed, 
the loss of marketability, the cost of conducting inspections 
that Should have been conducted, the extras wrongly charged 
claimants or other damages. For the purpose of this claim, 
claimants* estimate the total damages at $300,000 if damages 
instead of recision are awarded. 
In addition to the negligent conduct alleged above, 
it is further alleged that Salt Lake County did send inspec-
tors out on some occasions to inspect the progress of the 
building. Those inspectors knew, or should have known, that no 
building permit had been issued, and that no set of "approved" 
plans had been filed with the County for the building. Never-
theless, the said bulding inspectors failed to issue stop work 
orders, and otherwise permitted the construction to continue. 
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Claimants assert that because of the nature of 
Wallace Ray Noble's and Salt Lake County's actions, claimants 
are not required to give notice under the Governmental Immunity 
Act. Nevertheless, claimants give this notice to insure that 
the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act will be 
complied with in case a court would require it even under the 
circumstances of this case. 
DATED this /&ytji day of //IA^) 1986. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY for himself 
and as agent and atto/nev 
for JOAN / " DEBRY 
RJD/ek 
EXHIBIT 3 
S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y 
D E V E L O P M E N T S E R V I C E S D I V I S I O N 
1033 ?.»•><::!: Sc.-.:o ?:ro.*: 
S e l l L:i!i.» ' . ' icy. rt.-«h . " i l l 5
 3 a S t f i r f ! ,„ 
• «C V 
L\n:c or Service \ y v y 
NOTICE AND ORDER 
To: Kr. Robert DeBry 
*252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 8*107 
He: Office Building at 4252 South 700 East 
Notice: The referenced building is being occupied in violation cf 
Section 307 (a) of the Uniform Building Code, in that there 
is no valid "Certificate of Occupancy", the "Temporary 
Certificate of Occupancy" issued December 6, 1985, has 
expired, and the corrections required by this department en 
Harch 19, 1986, subsequent to a requested inspection 
performed by this department ha*L" r.n^  frrr-rr. -nds. 
Order: Yoy^ -ica hereby ordered tot^ vacate the building within 10 
d^aj/s*X Furthermore, the buiicmg snaii rn.u«.l** «./...iiitLirl' 
until such time as a valid "Certificate of Occupancy" is 
issued. 
A "Certificate of Occupancy" will be issued only after 
submittal'and approval of as-built drawings, certification 
from.a licensed engineer as to the adequacy of the 
structure, payment of all fees prescribed by law, and a 
final inspection showing compliance with code requirements. 
The final inspection will not be performed until the 
aforementioned administrative requirements have been met.. 
This order is issued under authoritv of Section 202 Ce) of 
the Uniform Building Code. 
Sincerely, /~\_^ 
CA*L ESIKSSCtf, Secrion Hanager 
Inspection Services 
CE/jb 
cc: Paul Haughn-, Deputy County Attorney 
F1I F HflPY 
EXHIBIT 4 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: Paul G. Maughan (No. 2124) 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Salt Lake County Defendants 
and Wallace R. Noble 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY. 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general 
partnership; DEL K. BARTEL; 
DALE THURGOOD; ROBERT G. HILL; 
UTAH TITLE- AND ABSTRACT CO.; 
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, a general 
partnership; LEE ALLEN BARTEL; 
SALMON AND ALDER, INC.; WILLIAM 
TRIGGER d.b.a. TRIGGER ROOFING; 
ZEPHYR ELECTRIC. INC.; SAWYER 
GLASS CO., INC.; TRIAD SERVICES 
CO., INC.; VALLEY MORTGAGE 
CORP.. INC.; RICHARDS-WOODBURY 
MORTGAGE CORP.; WALLACE R. 
NOBLE, individually and in his 
official capacity: SALT LAKE 
COUNTY; SCOTT MCDONALD REALTY, 
INC.; STANLEY POSTMA; TRI-K 
CONTRACTORS; KEN BAR MANUFAC-
TURING COMPANY; GRANDEUR HOMES; 
BUILDERS COMPONENTS; SOTER-
KNUDSEN; VAN ELLSWORTH dba 
DRAFTING UNLIMITED; CANADA LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY; BUILDING 
SYSTEMS. INC., and FIDELITY 
NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE CO. , 
Defendants. 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY'S AND 
WALLACE RAY NOBLE'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-553 
Judge Pat Brian 
I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiffs have filed an action against Salt Lake 
County, the Salt Lake County Public Works Department, and the 
County's Building Official, Wallace Ray Noble, based upon the 
latter's issuance of a thirty day temporary certificate of 
occupancy for the building located at 4252 South 700 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. The plaintiffs are subsequent purchasers of 
the building, and have initiated this action for various 
alleged engineering and construction defects in the building. 
II 
FACTS 
Defendants believe no issues of material fact exist in this 
action. The facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs, demonstrate the following: 
1. Salt Lake County issued a footings and foundations 
permit to Cascade Construction over the signature of Del Bartel 
during the fall of 1984 for the premises located at 4252 South 
700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter the property). 
2. During the course of construction the County made 
several inspections of the property. 
3. On December 6, 1985, at the request of Del Bartel and 
Cascade Construction, and in reliance upon Bartel1s statements 
that all necessary permits for the building had been obtained 
by Cascade Construction, the Building Official of Salt Lake 
County issued a temporary certificate of occupancy to Cascade 
Construction allowing occupancy of the building for thirty 
-2-
days. During this thirty day period. Cascade was to complete 
the building and meet all requirements for both a final 
inspection and a permanent certificate of occupancy. (See 
Affidavit of Ray Noble-) 
4. Both the plaintiffs and the contractors were aware 
that at the time the temporary certificate of occupancy was 
issued on December 6, 1985, and on the day of closing December 
10, 1985, that the building remained uncompleted and that each 
had a responsibility to perform additional work on the 
building. (See Exhibits F and H of plaintiffs' complaint, 
entitled "Escrow and Non-Merger Agreement" dated December 10, 
1985, attached hereto as Appendix A.) 
5. Plaintiffs also knew that the certificate of occupancy 
was only temporary and required defendants Thurgood and Bartel 
to bond for any work required for plaintiffs to continue 
occupancy of the building beyond the thirty days allowed by the 
Building Official. (See paragraph 7 of Appendix A.) 
6. The necessary steps for the completion of the building 
and the issuance of a final certificate of occupancy were not 
completed within said thirty days, nor have such conditions 
been completed as of this date by either the builder or the 
plaintiffs herein. (Affidavit of Ray Noble.) 
7. The County, on several occasions, notified both the 
plaintiffs and the builder of the conditions required before a 
final inspection can or will be made by Salt Lake County and a 
determination made as to whether a final certificate of 
occupancy will be issued. (See Affidavit of Ray Noble.) 
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8. On November 3, 1986 the County issued a notice and 
order ordering plaintiffs to quit the premises within ten 
days. The order was based upon the plaintiffs' and builder's 
failure and refusal to correct building code violations in the 
building, obtain a building permit, submit as-built drawings. 
and pay required fees. (See Exhibit D of Noble's Affidavit.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS SALT LAKE COUNTY AND WALLACE R. 
NOBLE ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT PURSUANT TO THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
SECTION 63-30-1. ET SEQ.. UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED. 
The County and its Building Official are being sued on the 
basis of the issuance of a temporary certificate of occupancy 
which permitted the occupancy of plaintiff's building for a 
thirty day period. Noble is named as a defendant both in his 
official capacity as a representative of Salt Lake County and 
as an individual. 
The plaintiffs' action against said defendants fails on the 
basis of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act. Section 63-30-1. et 
seq.f Utah Code Annotated 1953. as amended, which provides in 
relevant part: 
11
 Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury: 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, 
suspension, or revocation of, or by the 
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POINT III 
SALT LAKE COUNTY'S ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
BUILDING CODE ORDERING PLAINTIFFS TO VACATE 
THE PROPERTY NEARLY TEN MONTHS AFTER THE 
EXPIRATION OF THE THIRTY DAY TEMPORARY 
CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY DID NOT DENY 
PLAINTIFFS ANY OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS. 
At the request of the contractor Salt Lake County issued a 
certificate of occupancy allowing occupancy of the building for 
thirty days. At no time were any statements, conversations, or 
statements made to plaintiffs regarding the issuance of a 
temporary certificate of occupancy. 
Based in part upon the previously issued thirty day 
certificate of occupancy the plaintiffs elected to close their 
purchase of the building. The temporary certificate of 
occupancy for the building was issued on condition that all 
remaining requirements regarding the decision to finalize the 
purchase of the building based upon a temporary thirty day 
certificate of occupancy was solely that of the plaintiffs. 
.Salt Lake County only represented that the building could be 
lawfully occupied for thirty days and during said time it was 
to be completed and the requirements of the building code met. 
Any damages suffered by the plaintiffs are a result of 
their own actions, not those of the County. Plaintiffs1 
assertions that the County's enforcement of the building code 
violate plaintiffs' First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights is fatuous. 
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The enforcement of the building code is a lawful exercise 
of the County's police power. not a deprivation of 
constitutional rights. 
"A municipal corporation may prohibit 
the use and occupancy of certain buildings, 
where the prohibition is justified as a 
proper exercise of the police power to 
protect the public health, safety, welfare 
and morals. It may, for example, prohibit 
the use or occupancy of a building or 
portion thereof for failure to comply with 
the requirements of an ordinance, where the 
owner or occupant fails, after notice to 
make the building comply therewith." 
"Unquestionably it is the official duty 
of city officials charged with the respon-
sibility of administering and enforcing 
municipal building codes and ordinances to 
discharge that responsibility faithfully, 
exercising sound judgment where discretion 
is vested in them, but courts will not 
interfere with their exercise of discretion 
except for abuse thereof. It has been held 
that mandamus does not lie to compel a city 
to enforce building regulations. Moreover, 
the neglect of a municipality and its 
officers or employees to enforce the 
detailed provisions of a building code 
creates no civil liability to individuals." 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., 
§24.552. 554, pp. 233, 236. 
it 
POINT IV 
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY PUBLIC WORKS DEPART-
MENT IS NOT A LEGAL ENTITY THAT CAN SUE OR 
BE SUED. 
The Public Works Department of Salt Lake County i s a 
department organized by Salt Lake County, a body corporate and 
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EXHIBI'l 
IN THE UTAH fUlPRFMP COURT 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN 
DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
tlhLu : NOBLE, Individ-
ually and in his capacity 
as Chief Building Official 
cf Salt Lake County; and 
: *.L2 LAKE COUNTY , 
..: us/ Respondents. 
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED TW 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN, JUDGE 
EDWARD T . WELLS - AH22 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT H4J07 
Telephone: («»n 2t.2-89l5 
PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
DEPUTY SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
2001 South State St., S-3400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-3421 
Telephone: (801) 4G8-T4ro 
BRIFF 01' APPELLANT:* 
Supreme Court. 
Case No ooo;1 l 
Cnfrgor y li (Lj 
v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Martinez v. 
California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 
(9th Cir. 1988); Grandstaff v. City of Borcrer. 767 F.2d 161 (5th 
Cir. 1985); Leverett v. Town of Limon, 567 F.Supp. 471 (D.Colo. 
1983); Wilson v. Jackson, 505 A.2d 913 (Md. App. 1988). 
B. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Does Not Bar the DeBrysf 
Due Process Claims for Retaliation. 
1. Factual basis of the claim. 
Even though the lower court did not determine whether 
there were facts sufficient to establish a due process claim, there 
is a factual basis for the claim summarized as follows: 
The County issued a temporary certificate of occupancy 
allowing the building to be occupied. The temporary certificate 
listed only a few items to be finished or corrected. None of them 
were hazardous or life threatening. (Deposition of Wallace R. 
Noble depo. May 9, 1990 p. 110 (hereinafter "Noble depo. II 
p. . " ) ; Deposition of Carl Eriksson April 23, 1990 pp. 94-96 
(hereinafter "Eriksson depo. p. . " ) . The Countyfs policy and 
practice is to allow repairs to be made while the occupant remains 
in possession of the building. (Noble depo. II. pp. 104-105; 
Eriksson depo. pp. 83-85.) The County's policy is to also notify 
the property owner of completion of the items listed on a temporary 
certificate of occupancy is not proceeding at a satisfactory pace. 
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Onev v. Oklahoma City, 120 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1941); State v. 
Phillips. 540 P.2d 936 (J. Maughn, dissenting Utah 1975). 
Due process limits the governments ability to deprive an 
individual of life, liberty or property. Deshonev v. Winnebago 
County Dept. of Social Services, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989). "Protec-
tion against arbitrary governmental action is the great purpose of 
the due process clause." Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 
(1889); Wilwording v. Swenson, 502 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1974). 
Specifically, the 1st Amendment and the due process 
clause prohibit the government from retaliating against an 
individual for exercising his constitutional rights. Blackridcre v. 
Perry. 417 U.S. 21 (1971). 
In this case, the DeBrys claimed that the County evicted 
them from the building as retaliation for filing a notice of claim 
with the County. 
Presenting a notice of claim is protected speech for 1st 
Amendment purposes, see, Pickering v. Flacke. 453 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 
1018 (N.Y.Supp. 1982). Similarly, the DeBrys1 right to litigate is 
protected by the 1st Amendment. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan 
American World Airways, 604 F.Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1984); Eilers v. 
Palmer, 575 F.Supp. 1259 (D. Minn. 1984). 
The DeBrys have the right to petition for redress without 
the fear of retribution. Simply put, neither the County nor Noble 
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Similarly, whether Noble has qualified immunity from suit 
in his personal capacity is also a fact question. The common law 
defense of good faith qualified immunity for a governmental 
employee sued in his individual capacity applies when the defendant 
performs his statutory duty honestly and in good faith. Hiorth v. 
Whittenburq, 241 P. 2d 907 (Utah 1952). Whether Noble performed his 
duty honestly and in good faith are both questions of fact. see, 
Smith v. Losee. 485 F.2d 334, 345 (10th Cir. 1973). The lower 
court made no finding and there was no factual showing that Noble 
performed his duties honestly and in good faith. 
In summary, there is a factual issue as to whether the 
County and Noble evicted the DeBrys as retaliation for the Debrys 
exercising their 1st, 5th and 14th Amendment rights to petition 
for redress of their grievances. There is also a factual issue as 
to whether the DeBrys were deprived of their constitutional rights 
pursuant to a practice or policy of the County. The lower court 
could not and did not resolve these fact issues. The court merely 
ruled that the County and Noble are immune from the Debrys1 
constitutional claims. However, there is no statutory immunity for 
local government and its employee acting in his official capacity. 
Moreover, whether Noble has qualified immunity from suit in his 
individual capacity depends upon whether he acted honestly and in 
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As a result of the Countyfs failure to enforce the law, 
the DeBrys purchased a defective office building. The cost to 
repair the building exceeds $333,515. In addition, the County 
prevented the DeBrys from using the building. The additional rent 
paid by the DeBrys totals over $351,6047. 
2. Legal analysis. 
The due process clause prevents local government from 
denying individuals a liberty or property interest without due 
process of law. Martinez v. California. 277 U.S. 279 (1980). A 
"property interest" for due process purposes "denotes a broad range 
of interests that are secured by existing rules or understanding." 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d 
1243, 1297 (Utah 1982). The property interests are defined broadly 
because: 
The spirit of enterprise which impels a person 
to initiate and develop a business which 
provides services to the public and employment 
for others is vital to the common welfare. Id. 
Specifically, the right to occupy a house or building is 
a property right protected by the due process clause. Buchanan v. 
Warlev, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Polenz v. Parrott. 853 F.2d 551 (7th 
Cir. 1989). 
7These figures were developed in testimony at trial of the main 
action. Trial Transcript pp. 698, 845. 
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